39057-ple_19-2 reissue Sheet No. 54 Side A

04/17/2017 09:23:23

3_AZGAD-TROMER_TO PRINTER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

3/13/17 1:43 PM

THE VIRTUOUS CORPORATION: ON CORPORATE
SOCIAL MOTIVATION AND LAW
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Above and beyond their traditional financial roles, contemporary
corporations increasingly assume a normative role, promoting social
agendas. The myriad normative roles assumed by the corporation, from
profit-centered corporate goodness to environmental and human rights
corporate agendas and to corporate philanthropy, comprise an emerging
corporate social identity. This article asks what induces corporations to
pursue social agendas and provides an initial taxonomy for corporate social
motivation showing that the incentives to pursue normative corporate
conduct are often rooted in the business purpose itself. Central policy
challenges are discussed, outlining the promise and the peril of emerging
corporate social identities.
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INTRODUCTION
Above and beyond their traditional financial roles, contemporary
corporations are increasingly assuming a normative role, promoting social
agendas well beyond their organizational boundaries. According to 2015
sustainability reports, the normative outreach of contemporary S&P 500
corporations is growing with exuberance, notwithstanding their ultimate
commitment to shareholder value. Among other social causes, American
corporations now tackle chronic malnutrition and hunger, fight disease
pandemics, mitigate gender inequality, and promote human rights.1
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1. See, e.g., Rita Vilk et al., Gender and Corporate Social Responsibility: Big Wins
for Gender and Society?, 156 PROCEDIA - SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 198, 198-202
(2014) (discussing the rise of corporate action in addressing gender issues); Alistair Barr,
Google’s “Don’t Be Evil” Becomes Alphabet’s “Do The Right Thing”, WALL ST. J.: DIGITS
(Oct. 2, 2015), http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2015/10/02/as-google-becomes-alphabet-dont-beevil-vanishes/ [https://perma.cc/MFD3-FX7E] (discussing Alphabet Inc.’s motto “Do the
Right Thing” and its corporate ancestor “Don’t be Evil”); Deepa Seetharaman & Anupreeta
Das, Mark Zuckerberg and Priscilla Chan to Give 99% of Facebook Shares to Charity,
WALL ST. J. (Dec. 2, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/mark-zuckerberg-priscilla-chan-togive-99-of-facebook-stock-to-philanthropy-1449005878
[https://perma.cc/3Z4X-B6UP]
(discussing Mark Zuckerberg and Priscila Chan’s recent pledge to create a new “foundation
that would initially focus on ‘personalized learning, curing disease, connecting people and
building strong communities’” with 99% of their Facebook shares); Rachel Soares et al.,
Gender and Corporate Social Responsibility: It’s a Matter of Sustainability, CATALYST,
2011, 1-3 (exploring the connection between corporations’ treatment of gender issues and
sustainability); Citizensship 2014 Performance Summary, DISNEY 4-7, https://ditm-twdcus.storage.googleapis.com/FY14-Performance-Summary.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Q9WEKPWU] (last visited Feb. 7, 2017) (summarizing Disney’s efforts to have a positive
corporate impact); Community: Creating Pathways to Opportunity, STARBUCKS,
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Promotion of social agendas by corporations is one of the greatest
controversies of corporate law.2 This paper exclusively focuses on a
narrower mission: to suggest an initial taxonomy of incentives underlying
corporate social agendas. Incentive analyses for corporate social agendas
may shed light on the potential merit, and possible risks, of corporate social
identities, to be further explored in future works.
Social values are embedded in every corporate decision. Corporations
have always generated norms within their organizational boundaries, and
social values are embedded in every corporate decision, from employment
policies to customer service and business development.3 Yet, the social
agendas assumed by contemporary corporations are open, dynamic, and
diverse, stretching far beyond the corporate organizational boundaries and
aiming to influence society as a whole.4 The myriad normative roles
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http://www.starbucks.com/responsibility/community [https://perma.cc/WYF2-UN8Y] (last
visited Jan. 26, 2017) (discussing Starbucks’ declaration of corporate conscience);
Foundation and Corporate Responsibility, BRISTOL-MYERS SQUIBB, CORPORATE
RESPONSIBILITY REPORT 1 (2014), http://www.bms.com/Documents/foundation/BMSCorporate-Responsibility-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/D2RC-579F] (outlining BristolMyers Squibb’s 2014 corporate social responsibility report and its mission to fight disease);
Ikea
FY15
Group
Sustainability
Report,
22-48,
IKEA
http://www.ikea.com/ms/en_US/img/ad_content/2015_IKEA_sustainability_report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5A6R-YPVQ] (last visited Feb. 7, 2017) (outlining Ikea’s environmental
sustainability efforts).
2. See, e.g., Christopher Geczy et al., Institutional Investing When Shareholders Are
Not Supreme, 5 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 73, 75-78 (2015) (analyzing the relationship between
high fiduciary duty institutions and benefit corporations). See generally Leo E. Strine, Jr.,
The Dangers of Denial: The Need for A Clear-Eyed Understanding of the Power and
Accountability Structure Established by the Delaware General Corporation Law, 50 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 761 (2015) (examining a pragmatic view of the effects of Delaware
corporate law on corporate responsibility).
3. See Mark DeWolfe Howe, The Supreme Court, 1952 Term, 67 HARV. L. REV. 91,
91 (1953) (arguing that “government must recognize that it is not the sole possessor of
sovereignty, and that private groups within the community are entitled to lead their own free
lives and exercise within the area of their competence an authority so effective as to justify
labeling it a sovereign authority.”). Consider the norm-generating role taken by
corporations in employee training. The organization is a sphere of law and sovereignty, and
institutional boundaries are used to define the breadth of corporate authority. See generally
Shlomit Azgad-Tromer, The Case for Consumer-Oriented Corporate Governance,
Accountability and Disclosure, 17 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 227 (2015) (discussing the need for
corporate disclosure standards for businesses offering products or services to the public to
enhance corporate informational accountability).
4. See Fabrizio Cafaggi & Katharina Pistor, Regulatory Capabilities: A Normative
Framework for Assessing the Distributional Effects of Regulation (Columbia Law Sch. Pub.
Law and Legal Theory Working Grp., Working Paper No. 13-354, July 5, 2013),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2290218 (providing a theoretical discussion of self-determined
norms and regulatory capability); see also Azgad-Tromer, supra note 3 (discussing further
examples of these agendas); Howe, supra note 3 (providing examples of corporate social
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assumed by the corporation, from profit-centered corporate goodness to
environmental and human rights corporate agendas and to corporate
philanthropy, comprise an emerging corporate social identity. The article
critically explores the strategic incentives underlying corporate social
identities, showing that the social engagement of corporations is often
rooted in the business purpose itself,5 and serving to satisfy the normative
taste of various stakeholder constituencies, such as responsible investors,6
engaged employees,7 virtuous managers,8 and conscious consumers.9 A
strategic analysis of incentives for corporate social motivation may serve to
create a better architecture of corporate law, focusing on variances of
corporate behavior that are less likely to be voluntarily addressed.
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agendas);.
5. For a survey of strategic value of corporate social responsibility, see generally
Michael E. Porter & Mark R. Kramer, Strategy and Society: The Link Between Competitive
Advantage and Corporate Social Responsibility, HARV. BUS. REV., Dec. 2006, at 1
[hereinafter Strategy] (examining how businesses can be financially successful and socially
responsible); Michel E. Porter & Mark R. Kramer, The Competitive Advantage of Corporate
Philanthropy, HARV. BUS. REV., Dec. 2002, at 1 [hereinafter Advantage] (describing the
add-value of corporate social responsibility).
6. Anna Prior, Investors Follow Their Conscience, WALL ST. J. (July 17, 2015),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/investors-follow-their-conscience-1437154588
[https://perma.cc/3KRX-DHCF].
7. See generally Christopher Marquis et al., Note, Corporate Social Responsibility
and Employee Engagement, HARV. BUS. SCH. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR UNIT CASE NO.
410-138
(2010),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2038012
[https://perma.cc/SH5D-3ND5]
(analyzing the link between CSR and employee engagement); Caroline Flammer & Jiao
Luo, Corporate Social Responsibility as an Employee Governance Tool: Evidence from a
Quasi-Experiment (Nov. 2015) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2380336
[https://perma.cc/6WFN-B9QP] (examining whether companies employ corporate social
responsibility to improve employee engagement and to mitigate adverse workplace
behavior).
8. See, e.g., Ronald W. Masulis & Syed Walid Reza, Agency Problems of Corporate
Philanthropy
1
(ECGI,
Finance
Working
Paper
No.
370,
2014),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2234221 [https://perma.cc/W5K4-X8J5] (stating that corporate
giving can reflect a CEO’s preferences).
9. C.B. Bhattacharya, Diogo Hildebrand & Sen Sankar, Corporate Social
Responsibility: A Corporate Marketing Perspective, 45 EUR. J. MKTG. 1353, 1353-1364
(2011); C.B. Bhattacharya, N. Craig Smith & David Vogel, Integrating Social
Responsibility and Marketing Strategy: An Introduction, 47 CAL. MGMT. REV. 6, 6-7 (2004);
Amihai Glazer et al., Firms’ Ethics, Consumer Boycotts, and Signalling, 26 EUR. J. POL.
ECON. 340, 340-350 (2010); Jill Gabrielle Klein et al., Why We Boycott: Consumer
Motivation for Boycott Participation, 68 J. MKTG. 92, 92-109 (2004); Jeff Fromm, 10
Things Millennial CEOs will Reimagine in America, FORBES (Apr. 8, 2014),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/onmarketing/2014/04/08/10-things-millennial-ceos-willreimagine-in-america/ [https://perma.cc/ED6C-3BTX] (stating that “[m]illennials expect
brands
to give back, be authentic and transparent”).
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Contemporary corporations celebrate their organizational conscience10
and actively promote social values in their normal business practice. The
business of corporate America is not simply business, it is virtuous
business. “If you want me to do things only for ROI [Return on
Investment] reasons,” advised Apple’s CEO Tim Cook in defense of
Apple’s environmental values, “you should get out of this stock.”11 This
dash for virtue is induced and reported through sustainability reporting,
thereby creating a transparent environment for non-financial corporate
performance.12 Sustainability reporting encourages management to set
goals, measure performance, and manage organizational change in a variety
of social and moral issues.13 G4 standards issued by the Global Reporting
Initiative (GRI) set a format of recommended disclosures on stakeholder
engagement, ethics and integrity, environmental and social management
approaches, labor practices, decent work conditions, product responsibility,
human rights and more.14 By 2017, it is highly customary for public
corporations to disclose sustainability information;15 more than 6,000
companies are now issuing sustainability reports,16 with 499 of the S&P
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10. For example, see Community: Creating Pathways to Opportunity, STARBUCKS,
http://www.starbucks.com/responsibility/community [https://perma.cc/N924-DUZ2] (last
visited Jan. 27, 2017) (showing an example of a company publicly declaring corporate
responsibility).
11. Geczy et al., supra note 2, at 75; Leif Johnson, Angry Tim Cook Tells Climate
Change Skeptic to Get Out of Apple Stock, WEST MICH. DESIGN AND TECH. SOLUTIONS (Mar.
3, 2014), http://www.wmtds.com/angry-tim-cook-tells-climate-change-skeptic-to-get-outof-apple-stock-2/ [https://perma.cc/J7CT-XUX5].
12. Mandating the disclosure of non-financial information about corporate
performance in environmental, social and governance issues has become, by 2016,
widespread, including countries such as the U.K., Denmark, South Africa, China, Malaysia,
Brazil, Hong Kong, and India. A recently published study suggests that mandatory
sustainability disclosures are associated with increases in firm valuations, as reflected in
Tobin’s Q. See Ioannis Ioannou & George Serafeim, The Consequences of Mandatory
Corporate Sustainability Reporting: Evidence from Four Countries 2-3 (Harvard Business
School, Research Working Paper No. 11-100, 2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1799589
[https://perma.cc/HC79-25U5] (describing the countries that require non-financial corporate
reports).
13. See GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE, Preface to G4 SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING
GUIDELINES
(2015),
https://www.globalreporting.org/resourcelibrary/GRIG4-Part1Reporting-Principles-and-Standard-Disclosures.pdf [https://perma.cc/6NW2-FJJW] (issuing
guidelines to encourage corporate management to adopt sustainable initiatives).
14. GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE, G4 SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING GUIDELINES 9, 20,
25, 43 (2015).
15. Shlomit Azgad-Tromer, Corporations and the 99%: Team Production Revisited, 21
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 163, 164, 194 (2016).
16. Id. at 194 (citing Integrated Financial and Sustainability Reporting in the United
States,
INVESTOR
RESPONSIBILITY
RESEARCH
INSTITUTE
(2013),
http://irrcinstitute.org/pdf/FINAL_Integrated_Financial_Sustain_Reporting_April_2013.pdf
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500 companies having made a sustainability disclosure or linked financial
performance with a sustainability initiative.17
Corporations often adhere to the G4 format in reporting about their
social impact and sustainability, but sometimes they report in their own
format, deciding for themselves what matters in the sphere of their social
doing and what activities should be classified as socially responsible.18
Nestle’s voluntary disclosure of November 2015, which reveals the fact
that slavery and forced labor are present in its seafood supply chain, is a
good example. Nestle has voluntarily committed to employ protective
measures in its global operations and to impose stricter standards on its
suppliers.19 Kering is another good example: in May 2015, it published an
open-sourced environmental profit and loss account, voluntarily measuring
its environmental footprint in its own operations and across its supply
chains, and valuing it in monetary terms.20
Further social fuel is added to the corporate arena through alternative
purpose firms, such as the benefit corporation, which are officially
committed to social goals, despite potential conflicts with profit
maximization.21 Finally, corporations promote normative agendas through
philanthropy; according to statistics released by the Committee
Encouraging Corporate Philanthropy’s (CECP) 2015 Giving in Numbers
report, median total giving as a percentage of pre-tax profit was one
percent, both in 2012 and in 2014.22
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) [https://perma.cc/C22A-WTVD].
17. Id.
18. See Ikea FY15 Group Sustainability Report, supra note 1 (making it a business
priority to have a positive impact on the planet).
19. Martha Mendoza, Nestlé Confirms Labor Abuse Among its Thai Seafood Suppliers,
THE SEATTLE TIMES (Nov. 28, 2015), http://www.seattletimes.com/business/nestleconfirms-labor-abuse-among-its-thai-seafood-suppliers-2/ [https://perma.cc/J62W-BFDU];
Nestlé Admits to Forced Labour in its Seafood Supply Chain in Thailand, THE GUARDIAN
(Nov. 24, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2015/nov/24/nestleadmits-forced-labour-in-seafood-supply-chain [https://perma.cc/6Z9M-9R62].
20. Kering is a corporate group in apparel and accessories markets, where it develops
and maintains luxury sport and lifestyle brands. Kering is present in more than 120
countries and generated revenues of 10 billion in 2014 with more than 37,000 employees
at year end. The Kering stock is listed on Euronext Paris. See generally Environmental
Profit
&
Loss
(E
P&L),
KERING
(2013),
http://www.kering.com/sites/
default/files/document/kering_epl_methodology_and_2013_group_results_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5FGH-PPQF].
21. Alicia E. Plerhoples, Delaware Public Benefit Corporations 90 Days Out: Who’s
Opting In?, 14 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 247, 247-280 (2014); Hans Rawhouser, Michael
E.Cummings & Andrew Crane, Benefit Corporation Legislation and the Emergence of a
Social Hybrid Category, 57 CAL. MGMT. REV. 13, 13-35 (2015).
22. CECP, Coalition Encouraging Corporate Philanthropy, is a coalition of CEOs
“united
in the belief that societal improvement is an essential measure of business
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Part I of this article provides an initial taxonomy of incentives for
corporate social motivation. Corporations are induced to normative social
conduct by the strategic demand of their stakeholder constituencies.23
Management’s ideology and social values, often labeled in the literature as
agency costs,24 induce corporations to social conduct in compliance with
management’s values. Impact and responsible investors demand social
performance and create incentives for normative corporate conduct.25
Employees are better engaged, easier to recruit and have lower turnover
and higher productivity when working for normative corporate
employers.26 Normative corporate conduct may also increase revenue, as
consumers are more loyal to virtuous brands.27 Finally, corporations may
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performance” and whose mission is to “create a better world through business”. Giving in
Numbers Report, CECP 10 (2015), http://cecp.co/measurement/benchmarkingreports/giving-in-numbers.html [https://perma.cc/J33Q-67CF].
23. For a survey of strategic values of corporate social responsibility, see generally
Porter & Kramer, Strategy, supra note 5, at 78; see also, Michel E. Porter & Mark R.
Kramer, Creating Shared Value, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan.-Feb. 2011, at 89; Michael E. Porter
& Mark R. Kramer, The Competitive Advantage of Corporate Philanthropy, HARV. BUS.
REV., Dec. 2002, at 56.
24. Howe, supra note 3; Azgad-Tromer, supra note 3; see also Part II A infra
(discussing the central policy challenges regarding corporate responsibility under soft
corporate governance). For a different view, see Zohar Goshen & Assaf Hamdani,
Corporate Control and Idiosyncratic Vision, 125 YALE L.J. 560, 565 (2016) (describing
management private values as idiosyncratic visions).
25. See Part II B infra (discussing how corporate shareholders can influence companies
to adopt high publicity social mindfulness campaigns). Virtue and goodness have also been
suggested to enhance shareholder financial value. See also generally Philipp Krüger,
Corporate Goodness and Shareholder Wealth, J. FIN. ECON. (forthcoming) (discussing the
positive shareholder reaction to deliberate corporate social responsibility aimed at
improving investor relations). Impact investments aim at making a beneficial social or
environmental impact alongside a financial return. See Jacob Gray et al., Great
Expectations: Mission Preservation and Financial Performance in Impact Investing,
WHARTON UNIV. OF PENNSYLVANIA: SOCIAL IMPACT INITIATIVE 3-4 (2015),
https://socialimpact.wharton.upenn.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Great-ExpectationsMission-Preservation-and-Financial-Performance-in-Impact-Investing.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3MS5-2JU3] (examining to what extent these two objectives can coexist).
26. BRADLEY K. GOOGINS, PHILIP H. MIRVIS & STEVEN A. ROCHLIN, BEYOND GOOD
COMPANY: NEXT GENERATION CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP 149 (2007); Marquis et al., supra
note 7; John Charlton, Blue-Chip Companies Seek Non-Cash Rewards, PERSONNEL TODAY
(Nov. 5, 2009), http://www.personneltoday.com/hr/blue-chip-companies-seek-non-cashrewards/ [https://perma.cc/7U4S-DQ5N] (cited in Marquis et al., supra note 7).
27. C.B. BHATTACHARYA ET AL., LEVERAGING CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY: THE
STAKEHOLDER ROUTE TO MAXIMIZING BUSINESS AND SOCIAL VALUE (2011); C.B.
Bhattacharya & Sankar Sen, Doing Better at Doing Good: When, Why, and How Consumers
Respond to Corporate Social Initiatives, 47 CAL. MGMT. REV. 9, 9-24 (2004). For analysis
of customer values of corporate social responsibility, see John Peloza & Jingzhi Shang, The
Conference Board Governance Center, What Business Leaders Should Know: Investing in
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engage in corporate virtue as a political strategy in order to avoid
regulation by signaling compliance with social norms, or as a manipulation
tactic aimed at achieving a desired regulatory result.28
Part II of this article provides a roadmap for the central policy
challenges to the emergence of corporate social identities.29 Contemporary
corporations have become norm-generating agents, creating non-binding
rules for social activity and normative impact.30 The corporation’s normgenerating role is a decentered process, where stakeholders participate in a
dynamic and systemic integration of values into a voluntary,31 selfdetermined corporate social identity.32 The resulting reflexive network of
corporate social identities is proliferated by soft global standardization,
setting normative and reporting guidelines for corporate social conduct
such as the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), the Sustainable Accounting
Standards Board (SASB), the UN Global Conduct Principles, the OECD
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, and ISO 26000.33 The rise of
corporate social motivation suggests a shift from substantive corporate law
towards a decentered and reflexive network of diverse corporate social
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CSR to Enhance Customer Value, 3 DIR. NOTES SERIES 1-8 (Feb. 2011) (discussing what
customers most value with corporate social responsibility and how it affects profit).
28. David P. Baron, Private Politics, Corporate Social Responsibility, and Integrated
Strategy, 10 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 7, 7-45 (2001); Roland Bénabou & Jean Tirole,
Individual and Corporate Social Responsibility, 77 ECONOMICA 1, 2 (2010).
29. See generally Jacob E. Gersen & Eric A. Posner, Soft Law: Lessons from
Congressional Practice, 61 STAN. L. REV. 571, 579 (2008) (explaining that the term “soft
law” usually refers to “a rule issued by a lawmaking authority that does not comply with . . .
formalities . . . that are necessary for the rule to be legally binding”).
30. See Julian Arato, Corporations as Lawmakers, 56 HARV. INT’L L.J. 229, 231 (2015)
(discussing this phenomenon in an international context).
31. See generally Strine, supra note 2 (explaining that the protection of non-investor
constituencies within corporation law itself is not currently available under Delaware law,
with the one exception of the benefit corporation, while other constituencies are protected
through externality regulations).
32. See generally Cafaggi & Pistor, supra note 4 (discussing the theory of selfdetermined norms and regulatory capabilities).
33. See GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE, supra note 14; Guidelines for Multinational
Enterprises, ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (OECD)
(2011), http://www.oecd.org/corporate/mne/ [https://perma.cc/DB6D-JPZQ]; ISO 26000 –
Social Responsibility, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR STANDARDIZATION (2014),
http://www.iso.org/iso/home/standards/iso26000.htm
[https://perma.cc/7L7M-G3XD];
SUSTAINABILITY ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD (SASB), http://www.sasb.org/
[https://perma.cc/RAE8-FHJL]; The Ten Principles of the UN Global Compact, UNITED
NATIONS,
https://www.unglobalcompact.org/what-is-gc/mission/principles
[https://perma.cc/QTC4-HZ6S] (last visited Jan. 29, 2017) (all setting forth their standards,
as non-governmental organizations, for sustainable best practices for multi-national
corporations).
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identities, governed by soft global standardization.34
The normative quest makes corporate performance vague and subject
to manipulation.35 Law can be specific, whereas morality is ultimately
vague, leaving room for self-interested interpretation.36 The rise of
corporate social identities is thus the rise of what Katharina Pistor calls
“Corporate Legal Particularism,” a self-contained legal order that serves
particular interests.37 Corporate social identities do not necessarily align
with social normative preferences. In particular, distributional preferences
of corporate leadership do not necessarily align with those channeled
through the tax system according to social interest,38 as demonstrated by the
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) Tax straddle. Indeed, social norms
and corporate social identities may serve as normative substitutes. The rise
of corporate social identities may thus pose a challenge to the democratic
ideal.
I.

STRATEGIC ANALYSIS OF CORPORATE SOCIAL MOTIVATION

C M
Y K

04/17/2017 09:23:23

34. See, e.g., id.
35. See Steven Davidoff Solomon, Idealism That May Leave Shareholders Wishing for
Pragmatism, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Oct. 13, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/14/
business/dealbook/laureate-education-for-profit-school-public-benefit.html
[https://perma.cc/UKR3-94YA] (discussing the vague corporate goals of some public
benefit corporations and the questions this raises from shareholders).
36. See Steven Shavell, Law Versus Morality as Regulators of Conduct, 4 AM. L. &
ECON. REV. 227, 242-43 (2002) (describing how the flexibility of soft corporate governance
often makes corporate social conduct disappointing, due to different conceptions of good by
various parties).
37. Katharina Pistor, Corporate Legal Particularism (June 17, 2016) (unpublished
paper for “Forms of Pluralism and Democratic Constitutionalism” conference in Paris) (on
file with author).
38. Bhattacharya, Smith, & Vogel, supra note 9; Bhattacharya, Hildebrand, & Sankar,
supra note 9; Glazer et al., supra note 9; Klein et al., supra note 9.
39. Why is a Benefit Corp Right for Me?, BENEFIT CORPORATION,
http://benefitcorp.net/businesses/why-become-benefit-corp [https://perma.cc/89SD-WDXR]
(last
 visited Jan. 29, 2017) (listing reasons to incorporate as a benefit corporation).
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Why do corporations engage in social causes? What drives corporate
normative social conduct? This part of the article provides a taxonomy of
corporate incentives to engage in normative agendas, suggesting that
corporate social identities emerge to cater the demand for social agendas
introduced by corporate stakeholder constituencies: investors, employees,
and consumers, as well as by the management’s private values and
idiosyncratic visions.39 Finally, normative corporate social conduct may
serve as a political strategy promoting the corporation’s core business
missions.
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A. Management Values: Idiosyncratic Visions and Agency Costs
When corporations engage in social values, managerial leadership gets
the privilege of directing corporate social contribution towards its own
normative goals and visions.40 Managers and controlling shareholders have
the prerogative to pursue their subjective values and normative preferences
as part of their idiosyncratic visions for the corporation.41 Idiosyncratic
visions do not have to concern an innovation or invention: as long as the
corporate leadership, management, controlling shareholders or
entrepreneurs have a plan they subjectively believe would lead the
corporation to merit, they have an idiosyncratic vision for corporate
leadership. The identity of the beneficiaries of corporate social agendas
may naturally be affected by management’s private interests and values, as
embedded in the corporate leadership.
Several researchers argue that corporate social conduct is a
manifestation of managerial agency problems inside the firm, enhancing
management’s value at the expense of shareholders.42 Researchers found
empirical support for three key indicators of an agency motive for
corporate social conduct.43 First, increasing insider ownership decreases
measures of firm goodness.44 Firms with moderate levels of insider
ownership cut goodness by more than firms with low levels (where the tax
cut has no effect) and high levels (where agency is less of an issue).45
Second, improved governance reduces corporate goodness. A regression
discontinuity design of close votes around the fifty percent cut-off finds
that passage of shareholder governance proposals leads to slower growth in
goodness.46 Third, the use of corporate jets is correlated with corporate

C M
Y K

04/17/2017 09:23:23

40. See generally Donald V. Moser & Patrick R. Martin, A Broader Perspective on
Corporate Social Responsibility Research in Accounting, 87 ACCT. REV. 797, 797-806
(2012) (discussing new research methods for corporate social responsibility).
41. See Zohar Goshen & Assaf Hamdani, Corporate Control and Idiosyncratic Vision,
125 YALE L.J. 560, 565-66 (2016) (describing controlling shareholders as entrepreneurs
instead of the prevailing view that they act to the detriment of minority shareholders).
42. See Krüger, supra note 25, at 5-6 (discussing the effects of corporate social
responsibility on the stock market). See also Bénabou & Tirole, supra note 28, at 1-19
(providing a commentary on agency issues relating to CSR); Ing-Haw Cheng, Harrison
Hong & Kelly Shue, Do Managers Do Good with Other People’s Money? 1-2 (Fama-Miller
Working Paper, 2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1962120 [https://perma.cc/QH6D-CGCA]
(discussing similar agency motives relating to corporate social responsibility).
43. Id.
44. Cheng, Hong & Shue, supra note 42, at 2-4.
45. Id.
 46. Id.
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goodness.47 Other research indicates that as giving increases, shareholders
reduce their valuation of cash holdings, suggesting corporate giving is a
manifestation of agency conflicts that reduce firm value.48 Further,
dividend increases are also associated with reduced corporate giving.49
Corporate giving is typically associated with CEO charity preferences,
indicating that firm donations advance CEO interests and studies suggest
that the misuse of corporate resources reduces firm value.50
B. Impact and Responsible Investments
“Investors follow their conscience,” says a Wall Street Journal
headline from July 2015,51 referring to moral trends of investments,
actively seeking to boost investors’ portfolios with virtuous corporations.
This “can encompass everything from boosting worker retention through
fair pay and good working conditions to preserving natural resources and
having a minimal impact on the environment.”52 Indeed, investors pay
increasing attention to non-financial social corporate performance and
sustainability matters.53 Asset managers seeking to promote moral values
are now so common that research firms dedicated to social and moral
assessment provide resources for “environmental, social and governance
(ESG) research.”54 According to the research firm Morningstar, as of 30
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47. Id.
48. See generally Ronald W. Masulis & Syed Walid Reza, Agency Problems of
Corporate Philanthropy, REV. FIN. STUD. 4,
(forthcoming) (European Corporate
Governance Institute, Working Paper No. 370, 2014) (finding that corporate giving
decreases firm value).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 2.
51. Prior, supra note 6.
52. Id.
53. See generally Sarah Dadush, Regulating Social Finance: Can Social Stock
Exchanges Meet the Challenge?, 37 U. PA. J. INT’L. L. 139, 139-230 (2015) (discussing the
merits of investing in enterprises that cater to poor and underserved populations); CENTER
FOR POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY & ZICKLIN CENTER FOR BUSINESS ETHICS AT THE WHARTON
SCHOOL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA, THE 2015 CPA-ZICKLIN INDEX OF
CORPORATE POLITICAL DISCLOSURE AND ACCOUNTABILITY 8 (2015) (finding that
increasingly large numbers of corporations have chosen to disclose their political spending
for the sake of ethical transparency); GOVERNANCE & ACCOUNTABILITY INSTITUTE, INC.,
SUSTAINABILITY — WHAT MATTERS? 3 (2014) (stating similar findings); KPMG LLP,
CURRENTS OF CHANGE: THE KPMG SURVEY OF CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY REPORTING
2015 28-30 (2015) (showing that an increasingly large portion of companies are choosing to
engage in corporate responsibility reporting).
54. About Us, EIRIS, http://www.eiris.org/about-us/ [https://perma.cc/7VDB-M6W3]
(last visited Jan. 30, 2017) (identifying itself as a “leading global provider of environmental,
social and governance (ESG) research, empowering responsible investors with independent
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June 2015, investors have poured nearly $8.2 billion into socially minded
stock and bond funds since 2013.55 Total assets in such funds have grown
roughly 59% over the past five years, to $72.6 billion, while assets in all
mutual funds have risen 52% to $12.5 trillion.56 Here is an illustration of
assets flowing to mutual funds with a socially responsible mandate in
recent years:

ILLUSTRATION 1 :ASSETS FLOWING INTO MUTUAL FUNDS
57
WITH A SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE MANDATE
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analysis and the tools to incorporate this information into investment decisions”).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Prior, supra note 6.
58. See generally Azgad-Tromer, supra note 15 (providing an analysis of institutional
investors as agents of the general public and the costs accompanying this agency).
59. Darren D. Lee & Robert W. Faff, Corporate Sustainability Performance and
Idiosyncratic Risk: A Global Perspective, 44 FIN. REV. 213, 225 (2009).
60. Allen Goss, Corporate Social Responsibility and Financial Distress, PROCEEDINGS
OF THE ADMIN. SCIENCE ASS’N OF CANADA 1 (2009).
61. Dan S. Dhaliwal et al., Voluntary Nonfinancial Disclosure and the Cost of Equity
Capital: The Initiation of Corporate Social Responsibility Reporting, 86 ACCT. REV. 59, 60
(2011);
Sadok El Ghoul et al., Does Corporate Social Responsibility Affect The Cost of
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Socially responsible investments are generally motivated by normative
considerations, yet some empirical evidence suggests that they have
supplemental economic merit.58 To list a few examples: a higher CSR
score is on average associated with lower idiosyncratic risk,59 a lower
probability of financial distress,60 lower cost of capital,61 more positive sell
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side analysts’ recommendations,62 and higher abnormal returns and longterm post-acquisition returns.63 Ferrell, Liang, and Renneboog find that
corporate social responsibility is associated with managerial pay-forperformance and maximization of firm value.64 Eccles, Ioannou, and
Serafeim show that companies voluntarily adopting environmental and
social policies, outperform their counterparts over the long term, in terms
of both stock market and accounting performance.65 The outperformance is
stronger in sectors where the customers are retail consumers.66 Cheng,
Ioannou, and Serafeim show that firms with better corporate social
responsibility performance face significantly lower capital constraints.67
Other scholars have shown that socially responsible firms are likely to
deliver more transparent and reliable financial information to investors, as
compared to firms that do not meet the same social criteria and are less
likely to manage earnings through discretionary accruals, to manipulate
real operating activities, and to be the subject of SEC investigations.68 Raj
Sisodia, David Wolfe, and Jagdish Sheth have selected firms on the basis
of their humanistic profiles, including their sense of purpose; how well they
are loved by customers, team members, suppliers, and communities; and
their culture and their leadership. They find that those humanistic firms
outperformed their market on a nearly nine-to-one ratio over a period of ten
years.69 Further research by Sisodia et al. reveals that the same companies


04/17/2017 09:23:23

C M
Y K

39057-ple_19-2 reissue Sheet No. 60 Side A

Capital?, 35 J. BANK. AND FIN. 2388, 2389 (2011); Allen Goss & Gordon S. Roberts, The
Impact of Corporate Social Responsibility on the Cost of Bank Loans, 35 J. BANK. & FIN.
1794, 1795 (2011).
62. Robert G. Eccles, George Serafeim & Michael P. Krzus, Market Interest in
Nonfinancial Information, 23 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 113, 127 (2011); see also Ioannis
Ioannou & George Serafeim, The Impact of Corporate Social Responsibility on Investment
Recommendations, 1 ACAD. OF MGMT. ANN. MEETING PROC. 1, 1-6 (2010) (finding that
positive corporate governance and environmental ratings impacted analysis).
63. Xin Deng, Jun-koo Kang & Buen Sin Low, Corporate Social Responsibility and
Stakeholder Value Maximization: Evidence from Mergers, 110 J. FIN. ECON. 87, 89 (2013).
64. Higher CSR is closely related to tighter cash, a proxy for better-disciplined
managerial practice, and higher pay-for-performance sensitivity. Allen Ferrell et al., Socially
Responsible Firms 3-4, 31 (European Corporate Governance Institute, Working Paper No.
432/2014, 2016).
65. Robert G. Eccles, Ioannis Ioannou & George Serafeim, The Impact of Corporate
Sustainability on Organizational Processes and Performance, 60 MGMT. SCI. 2835, 28352836 (2014).
66. Id. at 2838.
67. Beiting Cheng, Ioannis Ioannou & George Serafeim, Corporate Social
Responsibility and Access to Finance, 35 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 1, 1-23 (2014).
68. Yongtae Kim, Myung Seok Park & Benson Wier, Is Earnings Quality Associated
with Corporate Social Responsibility?, 87 ACCT. REV. 761, 790 (2012).
69. RAJ SISODIA ET AL., FIRMS OF ENDEARMENT: HOW WORLD-CLASS COMPANIES
P
ROFIT
FROM PASSION AND PURPOSE 14 (Jeanne Glasser Levine et al. eds., 2nd ed. 2007).
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outperform the S&P 500 by a factor of 10.5 over a period of fifteen years
from 1996 to 2011.70 Ethisphere has produced an annual list of the world’s
most ethical companies, assessed in terms of corporate citizenship and
responsibility, corporate governance, innovation that contributes to wellbeing, industry leadership, executive leadership, regulatory and reputation
track record, and internal systems of ethics or compliance programs.71 The
selected companies outperformed the S&P 500 “every year since the
inception of the program in 2007, by an average of 7.3 percent annually.”72
Charity is also associated with corporate performance. Lev, Petrovits,
and Radhakrishnan find that charitable contributions are significantly
associated with future revenue, a result particularly pronounced for firms
that are highly sensitive to consumer perception, where individual retail
consumers are the predominant customers.73 As the following illustrations
demonstrate, corporate social giving is correlated with better performance,
higher growth rates, and increased revenue.

PERFORMANCE

AND
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70. JOHN MACKEY & RAJ SISODIA, CONSCIOUS CAPITALISM: LIBERATING THE HEROIC
SPIRIT OF BUSINESS 101 (2014).
71. Id. at KINDLE location 4708.
72. Id.
73. Baruch Lev, Christine Petrovits & Suresh Radhakrishnan, Is Doing Good Good for
You? How Corporate Charitable Contributions Enhance Revenue Growth, 31 STRATEGIC
MGMT. J. 182, 182-184, 198 (2010).
 74. Giving in Numbers Report, supra note 22, at 7.
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ILLUSTRATION 3: REVENUE FROM SUSTAINABLE PRODUCTS
75
AND SERVICES
C. Employee Engagement
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75. Id. at 8.
76. Marquis et al., supra note 7.
77. TERENCE LIM, MEASURING THE VALUE OF CORPORATE PHILANTHROPY: SOCIAL
IMPACT, BUSINESS BENEFITS, AND INVESTOR RETURNS 31 (Committee Encouraging
Corporation Philanthropy 2010).
78. Marquis et al., supra note 7, at 2 (citing John Charlton, Blue-Chip Companies Seek
Non-Cash
Rewards,
PERSONNEL
TODAY
(Nov.
5,
2009),
http://www.personneltoday.com/hr/blue-chip-companies-seek-non-cash-rewards/).
79. Googins, supra note 26, at 149.
80. David A. Jones, Does Serving the Community Also Serve the Company? Using
Organizational
Identification and Social Exchange Theories to Understand Employee
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Corporate social identities may give corporations leverage in
connecting, recruiting, and motivating employees’ performance.76 Studies
have shown that more than seventy percent of employed Americans
deciding between two jobs offering the same location, job description, pay,
and benefits would choose to work for a company that also supports
charitable causes.77 For high-value employees, cash is no longer king, and
there are numerous other emotions corporations need to address in
recruiting employees and engaging them in the corporate mission.78 To
connect and engage employees, companies need to engage their human
identities and address their values.79 Field studies show that employees
involved in philanthropic initiatives showed a statistically significant
increase in their sense of identification with their respective corporate
employers, an increase also correlated with improved job performance.80
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Employees with a positive view of their organization’s corporate social
responsibility commitment also rate senior management as having high
integrity.81 Ethisphere’s selected companies have been found to enjoy
lower team member turnover.82
Corporate social responsibility often engages employees as the
beneficiaries of accountability, committing to “a great place to work,”
diversity, professional training and development, and wellness and benefits.
Significantly, corporate social responsibility engages employees in
contributing to other stakeholder constituencies: for example, better
customer service, as well participation in the corporation’s social agenda.83
Because employees search for meaning and values, a framework for
corporate social identity may be part of the moral “employee value
proposition” retaining individuals to the corporation and urging them to
stay longer and give their personal best.84
Engaging employees is a significant priority for corporations.
Corporate America struggles with making its employees fully engaged and
committed to its business, as the following illustration shows:






 

 

ILLUSTRATION 4: 2014 EMPLOYEE ENGAGEMENT IN THE
U.S.85
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Responses to a Volunteerism Programme, 83 J. OCCUPATIONAL & ORG. PSYCHOL. 857, 85861 (2010).
81. Marquis et al., supra note 7, at 3.
82. MACKEY & SISODIA, supra note 70, at KINDLE location 4708.
83. See, e.g., CAESARS ENTERTAINMENT, INSPIRING CITIZENSHIP: CORPORATE
CITIZENSHIP REPORT 2014-2015 43, 76 (2014-2015) (referring to employee engagement both
when employees are the beneficiaries and when other constituencies are the beneficiaries;
for example, rewards for customer service, which benefit both customers and shareholders,
and volunteering in the community, which benefits the public).
84. C.B. Bhattacharya, Sankar Sen & Daniel Korschun, Using Corporate Social
Responsibility to Win the War for Talent, 49 MIT SLOAN MGMT. REV. 37, 37 (2008).
85. Amy Adkins, Majority of U.S. Employees Not Engaged Despite Gains in 2014,
ALLUP
(Jan. 28, 2015), http://www.gallup.com/poll/181289/majority-employees-notG
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Corporate social identities are particularly appealing to the younger
workforce of Generation Y.86 Nearly seven of ten millennials say they are
aware of their employer’s commitment to social and environmental causes,
and sixty-five percent say that their employer’s social and environmental
activities “make them feel loyal to the company.”87 A study at Stanford
Business School suggests that corporate social responsibility can provide
incentives that are potentially more alluring than monetary compensation:
more than 90% of the MBAs in the study sample were willing to make a
financial sacrifice and forgo financial benefits in order to work for a firm
with a better reputation for corporate social responsibility and ethics.88
D. Marketing and Customer Relations
Corporations may engage in corporate social conduct as a signal for
the company’s virtuous social identity, aiming consumers to attribute virtue
to their brands.89 Bhattacharya and Sen refer to “consumer-company
identification” (CCI) as an extension of social identity theory.90
Consuming the moral brand of a virtuous corporation may contribute to


04/17/2017 09:23:23

C M
Y K

39057-ple_19-2 reissue Sheet No. 62 Side A

engaged-despite-gains-2014.aspx [https://perma.cc/AD5U-N8ZU].
86. Generation Y, also referred to as “Millennials,” are individuals born between 19781998, who seek “more responsibility and advancement . . . and highly prioritize these
qualities over job security.” Marquis et al., supra note 7, at 4; see Generation Y:
Powerhouse of the Global Economy, DELOITTE DEVELOPMENT LLC 4-11 (2009),
http://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/us/Documents/human-capital/us-consultinghc-generationy-snapshot-041509.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5DVU-5ART]
(describing
Generation Y traits and how employers can capitalize on those traits); see also KATHLEEN
SHAPUTIS, THE CROWDED NEST SYNDROME: SURVIVING THE RETURN OF ADULT CHILDREN 99
(1st ed. 2004) (coining Generation Y as “Generation Peter Pan” for its “delaying rites of
passage into adulthood” and refusal to grow up); Millennials, WIKIPEDIA
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Millennials#Traits [https://perma.cc/V3VU-QNAN] (last
visited Jan. 30, 2017) (explaining various characteristics of the generation).
87. Marquis et al., supra note 7, at 4 (quoting CONE INC. & AMP AGENCY, THE 2006
CONE MILLENNIAL CAUSE STUDY).
88. Bill Snyder, For MBA Grads, Corporate Responsibility Trumps Salary, STANFORD
BUSINESS: INSIGHTS (June 1, 2008), https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/insights/mba-gradscorporate-responsibility-trumps-salary [https://perma.cc/XBQ2-YNSG] (describing the
findings in the Stanford Business School study); see also David B. Montgomery &
Catherine A. Ramus, Corporate Social Responsibility Reputation Effects on MBA Job
Choice 7 (Stanford Graduate School of Business, Working Paper No. 1805, 2003),
http://www.gsb.stanford.edu/faculty-research/working-papers/corporate-socialresponsibility-reputation-effects-mba-job-choice [https://perma.cc/DEH5-U79T].
89. John C. Turner & Katherine J. Reynolds, The Story of Social Identity, in
REDISCOVERING SOCIAL IDENTITY 13-22 (Tom Postmes & Nyla R. Branscombe eds., 2010).
90. C.B. Bhattacharya & Sankar Sen, Consumer-Company Identification: A
Framework for Understanding Consumers’ Relationships with Companies, 67 J. MKTG. 76,
76,
 86 (Apr. 2003).
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consumers’ self-esteem, attaching consumers to the firm and enhancing its
brand value.91 Corporate social conduct has the potential to create value for
consumers, and it is the customer perception of this value that mediates the
relationship between corporate social conduct and subsequent financial
performance.92 Ethisphere’s list of most-ethical corporations has been
found to enjoy better brand reputation and higher customer loyalty.93
Cabral suggests there is a positive relationship between trust and the price
customers are willing to pay for a product or service—the higher the trust,
the more customers are willing to pay.94 In addition, the more consistent
the transactions that take place between a seller and a buyer, the harder it is
to break any trust previously built between them (whether good or bad).95
Cabral’s theory suggests there is a negative relationship between reputation
and the amount of money the corporation must invest in improving their
reputation.
As reputation increases, corporate leaders can invest
incrementally less in building their reputation without hurting the progress
they’ve made.96 High trust and reputation can together help corporations
earn higher profits.97 A corporation can not only increase the price of its
products and services, it can also decrease its expenses (the amount of
money invested in reputation management).98
Consumers affect corporate morality with a stick, and not only a
carrot. Firms deviating from accepted social and moral norms risk decline
in sales due to consumer boycotts. To list just a few recent examples,
Nestlé suffered a consumer boycott after selling inappropriate milk to
pregnant mothers in developing countries;99 Nike was boycotted over
alleged sweatshop conditions at Asian suppliers;100 Shell suffered a boycott

91. BHATTACHARYA ET AL., supra note 27; Bhattacharya & Sen, supra note 27, at 15-
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92. For analysis of customer values of Corporate Social Responsibility, see generally
Peloza & Shang, supra note 27 (explaining the value that corporate social responsibility
activities can create for customers and practical recommendations for creating corporate
social responsibility programs).
93. MACKEY & SISODIA, supra note 70, at KINDLE location 4708.
94. Luís M B Cabral, The Economics of Trust and Reputation: A Primer 26 (June
2005)
(unpublished
manuscript),
http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~lcabral/reputation/
Reputation_June05.pdf [https://perma.cc/DUF6-6FVC].
95. Id. at 7-8.
96. Id. at 20.
97. Id. at 14-19.
98. Id.
99. See Nestlé-free Zone, BABY MILK ACTION http://www.babymilkaction.org/
nestlefree [https://perma.cc/JA23-CAGU] (last visited Jan. 30, 2017) (describing the details
of the boycott of Nestle’s baby food due to it breaching international marketing standards).
100. Simon Birch, How Activism Forced Nike to Change Its Ethical Game, THE
G
UARDIAN
(July 6, 2012), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/green-living
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because of its plan to sink the Brent Spar oil platform at sea.101 The more
egregiously a consumer perceives the firm’s behavior, the more likely she
is to boycott.102 Boycotts thus serve a mechanism by which consumers can
hold firms accountable to perceived transgressions of corporate
normativity.103
E. Political Strategy
Corporations do not act in a political vacuum. Corporate social
conduct could be a means of placating regulators and public opinion to
avoid strict supervision in the future, or of attempting to raise rivals’ costs
by encouraging environmental, labor, or safety regulations that will
particularly handicap competitors.104 Organizational resources devoted to
corporate social conduct are aligned with the corporate business mission so
as to create a positive, virtuous public image of the corporation and thereby
leverage the corporation’s agendas with regulators and public officials.105
II.

CENTRAL POLICY CHALLENGES
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blog/2012/jul/06/activism-nike [http://perma.cc/6YC3-VZ2A].
101. Nathanel C. Nash, Oil Companies Face Boycott Over Sinking of Rig, N.Y. TIMES
(June 17, 1995), http://www.nytimes.com/1995/06/17/world/oil-companies-face-boycottover-sinking-of-rig.html [https://perma.cc/25PC-HH2Z].
102. Klein et al., supra note 9, at 93-96.
103. N. Craig Smith, Corporate Social Responsibility: Whether or How?, 45 CAL.
MGMT. REV. 52, 60-61 (2003).
104. Baron, supra note 28, at 12-13.
105. Bénabou & Tirole, supra note 28, at 12.
106. Arato, supra note 30, at 231-232.
107. The term “soft law” usually refers to “a rule issued by a lawmaking authority that
does not comply with . . . formalities . . . that are necessary for the rule to be legally
binding.” Gersen & Posner, supra note 29.
Examples include, but are not limited to, SASB, supra note 33; UNITED NATIONS, supra
note 33 (offering a principled approach for corporate fundamental responsibilities in the
areas of human rights, labor, environment, and anti-corruption); ISO, supra note 33;
GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE, G4 SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING GUIDELINES, REPORTING
P
 RINCIPLES, AND STANDARD DISCLOSURES, available at https://www.globalreporting.org/
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This part of the article provides a roadmap for some of the central
policy challenges of the emerging corporate social identities. Contemporary
corporations have become norm-generating agents, creating non-binding
rules for social activity and normative impact.106 The rise of corporate
social motivation suggests a shift from substantive corporate law towards a
decentered and reflexive network of diverse corporate social identities,
governed by soft global standardization.107 The normative quest makes
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corporate performance vague and subject to manipulation.108 Ultimately,
we need to ask: whose values does the corporation pursue? Corporate
social identities do not necessarily align with social normative
preferences.109 Social norms and corporate social identities may serve as
normative substitutes.
A. Soft Corporate Governance
The quest for virtue shifts corporations from passive to active roles,
where corporations become a norm-generating authority defining their
social identities and functions through a local organizational process.110
The resulting reflexive network of corporate social identities is proliferated
by soft global standardization, setting normative and reporting guidelines
for corporate social conduct, such as the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI),
SASB, the UN Global Conduct Principles, the OECD Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises, and ISO 26000.111
While traditional corporate governance creates mandatory incentives
and deals with the mitigation of agency costs with a mission to enhance
shareholder value,112 contemporary corporations adopt a soft, aspirational,
and voluntary norm-generating process to identify and promote their
corporate social identities.113 From the traditional financial realm of
corporations, contemporary corporations proceed to diverse social,
environmental, and economic agendas,114 reaching far beyond the
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resourcelibrary/GRIG4-Part1-Reporting-Principles-and-Standard-Disclosures.pdf
[https://perma.cc/959Q-TSXC]. The Global Reporting Initiative sets a list of standards for
corporate self-assessment and reporting, including gender equality and human rights.
GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIve, supra note 14; see also OECD, supra note 33, (providing
similar guidelines).
108. Solomon, supra note 35.
109. For articles analyzing this, see generally Bhattacharya, Smith, & Vogel, supra note
9; Bhattacharya, Hildebrand, & Sankar, supra note 9; Glazer et al., supra note 9; Klein et
al., supra note 9.
110. See Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of
Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 393 (2004) (discussing
the shift to a governance model and the effect that it has on the legal regime).
111. Geczy et al., supra note 2, at 79.
112. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, What is Corporate Law?, in THE
ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 1-19 (Reinier
R. Kraakman et al. eds., 2004).
113. See GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE, supra note 14 (explaining that stakeholder
dialogue is the recommended process for identification of material issues for disclosure
under the G4).
114. For examples of corporate disclosures of activities and agendas in environmental,
social,
and economic realms see supra note 1 (showing various American companies that
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organizational boundaries and often aiming for global social impact.115
The term “soft” corporate governance thus seeks to describe the
emerging rules of conduct established and enforced within the corporate
realm in the absence of directives of hard-binding mandatory corporate
law.116 Contemporary corporate governance is soft because its normgenerating authority is the corporation itself, induced by non-binding
global standardization.117 Jerry Mashaw defines soft law as consisting of
“social accountability regimes” that are “continuously revisable.”118 In
contemporary corporate governance, corporations voluntarily assume social
accountability in a continuously revisable process aiming to define their
social identities, and to promote their social agendas and regimes of
voluntary normativity, proliferating their financial purposes and
notwithstanding them.
As the corporate social identity is unique to each and every
corporation, the process of defining agendas for corporate social conduct
and clarifying corporate social motivation is internal at the local corporate
level.119 The corporation defines for itself its social agendas, sets its
normative involvement, and chooses its beneficiaries.120 Far from the topdown hierarchy of traditional corporate governance, contemporary
corporations assume an internal decision-making process, to define the
material contents of the corporation’s non-financial performance.121 The
corporation’s norm generating role is a decentered process, where
stakeholders participate in a dynamic and systemic integration of values
into a voluntary, self-determined corporate social identity.122
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are taking active roles in their communities).
115. See generally Part II infra (providing a discussion of corporate social motivation
beyond organizational boundaries and describing the policy issues relating to corporations’
new role in social responsibility).
116. Lobel, supra note 110, at 388.
117. See generally Gersen & Posner, supra note 29 (discussing the importance of soft
law, specifically congressional law).
118. Jerry L. Mashaw, Accountability and Institutional Design: Some Thoughts on the
Grammar of Governance, in PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY: DESIGNS, DILEMMAS AND
EXPERIENCES 115-156 (Michael W. Dowdle ed., 2006).
119. Liad Ortar, From Flexibility to Specificity: Practical Lessons from Comparing
Materiality in Sustainability Reports of the World’s Largest Financial Institutions, 1 INT’L J.
CORP. STRATEGY & SOC. RESP. 44, 51 (2016).
120. See generally Cafaggi & Pistor, supra note 4 (outlining a theoretical discussion of
regulatory capabilities).
121. See generally Stephen Kim Park & Gerlinde Berger-Walliser, A Firm-Driven
Approach to Global Governance and Sustainability, 52 AM. BUS. L.J. 255 (2015)
(discussing this contemporary process).
122. GRI, for example, recommends a stakeholder dialogue to determine the relative
materiality
of specific sustainability issues. See Ursa Golob & Klement Podnar, Critical
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The self-determined vision of corporate goodness is thus the result of
a local decision making process of the corporation, induced and
proliferated by soft global standardization.123 Corporations do not define
their social identities in a vacuum: normative agendas for corporations are
suggested and promoted by several global initiatives, including the UN
Global Conduct Principles,124 the OECD Guidelines for Multinational
Enterprises,125 and ISO 26000.126 Visions of corporate normativity are then
disclosed under global standards for corporate social transparency, such as
the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI)127 and SASB.128 The outcome is a
social network of corporate visions of goodness, where corporations are
further influenced to virtuous social conduct by corporate peers and by
industry standards.129
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Points of CSRRelated Stakeholder Dialogue in Practice, 23 BUS. ETHICS: A EUR. REV. 248,
248-257 (July 2014) (advising that in the dialogue of stakeholders, representatives should
state their views and participate in developing an organizational understanding of a
corporate social purpose and agenda).
123. See generally Daniel Halberstam, Local, Global and Plural Constitutionalism:
Europe Meets the World, in THE WORLDS OF EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONALISM, (Gráinne De
Búrca & J.H.H. Weiler eds., 2012) (discussing the advantages of walking the middle road
between globalism and localism).
124. See UNITED NATIONS, supra note 33 (outlining that “[t]he UN Global Compact’s
Ten Principles are derived from: the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the
International Labour Organization’s Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at
Work, the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, and the United Nations
Convention Against Corruption”).
125. See OECD, supra note 33 (highlighting that OECD guidelines are divided by
industry sectors).
126. See INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR STANDARDIZATION, supra note 33
(providing another method by which normative agendas might be defined).
127. See GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE, supra note 14 (outlining current sustainability
reporting guidelines).
128. See SASB, supra note 33 (laying out US sustainability disclosure standards).
129. See generally NOAH E. FRIEDKIN, A STRUCTURAL THEORY OF SOCIAL INFLUENCE
(Mark Granovetter ed., 1998) (focusing on the process of social influence, and on how this
process, when it is played out in a network of interpersonal influence, may result in
interpersonal agreements among actors who are located in different parts of a complexly
differentiated organization. This theory may be applied to the network of different
corporations in the corporate race to virtue and social identity).
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CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
SOFT
Decentered
Reflexive
Flexible
Contextualized
Social, Environmental,
Economic

NORM GENERATING
AUTHORITY

State

INSTITUTIONAL
ORGANIZATION

Top-down Hierarchy

MOTIVATOR FOR
PRIVATE ACTION

Liability

OUTREACH

Within Organizational
Boundaries

Corporation, induced
by Global soft
standardization
Stakeholder Dialogue
Informal
Corporate Decision
Making Process
Reputation
Public Image
Stakeholder Relations
Beyond Organizational
Boundaries

POWER

Hard
Coercive
Mandatory
Mitigate Agency Costs

CONTENT

CONCEPTUAL
FRAMEWORK

Soft
Aspirational
Voluntary
Promote Corporate
Social Identity

TABLE 1: FROM TRADITIONAL TO SOFT CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE
B. Corporate Social Motivation and Law
Understanding the strategic incentives for corporate social motivation
may serve to create a better architecture of corporate law, focusing on
variances of corporate conduct that are less likely to be addressed and are
significantly valuable for social welfare, as demonstrated by illustration 5
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below.130 The illustration offers a metric for the evaluation of corporate
social conduct.131 When a corporation engages in peripheral social activity
(as demonstrated by sections A and D), assessment of its corporate social
profile in light of the general value for social welfare is required.
Examples for such activities are meager budgets dedicated for social
activities with a high publicity profile, but low social impact. Finally,
when a corporation has sufficient strategic incentives to voluntarily engage
in social conduct that has significant social value, as demonstrated by
section B in illustration 5, the corporation fulfills a vision for social
corporate leadership, supplementing or substituting public governance.132





 
  
     


C

Where Law is most
needed
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130. Consider negative externalities as an example for section C. While the corporation
has meager incentives for virtuous conduct, society attributes considerable value to the issue
at hand and carries its full costs when corporate virtue fails to materialize.
131. Consider each dot as an instance of corporate social conduct. This schematic table
should be applied at the specific corporate level, as every corporation would have a different
profile of social activity and impact.
132. George Serafeim, The Role of the Corporation in Society: An Alternative View and
Opportunities for Future Research (Harvard Business School, Working Paper No. 14-110,
2014).


39057-ple_19-2 reissue Sheet No. 65 Side B

ILLUSTRATION 5: THE METRICS OF CORPORATE VIRTUE

39057-ple_19-2 reissue Sheet No. 66 Side A

04/17/2017 09:23:23

3_AZGAD-TROMER_TO PRINTER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

THE VIRTUOUS CORPORATION

3/13/17 1:43 PM

365

C. Distributional Consequences: Corporate Legal Particularism and
the CSR Tax Straddle
When corporations engage in social agendas, their leadership–
including controlling shareholders and managers–acquires the prerogative
to sit behind the corporate social wheel.133 Legal rules can specify the
desired contents, scope, and beneficiaries for corporate social conduct at a
highly detailed level.134 By contrast, corporate social identities cannot be
too detailed and nuanced:
because it is incentivized by various
stakeholders, and highly dependent on public opinion, corporate social
identities must be easy for the general public to note and identify, and must
be kept simple,135 leaving the management room for interpretation. The
potential for such self-interested interpretation by managers defeats the
purpose of curbing private advantage.136 Law can be specific, whereas
morality is ultimately vague.137
The vagueness of virtue allows for self-interested interpretation.
Because moral rules are so elusive, the interpretation given to them may
differ among various constituencies and may lead to aversion. Lack of
specific legal standards can be misused. Consider for example the recent
scandal of Volkswagen in late 2015: from the top of the list of car firms in
the Dow Jones Sustainability Index, it was caught using sophisticated
software to avoid compliance with environmental regulation.138 Indeed,
morality is often disappointing. “If I had a yaller dog that didn’t know no
more than a person’s conscience does, I would pison him” declares
Huckleberry Finn towards the end of his journey down the Mississippi,139
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133. See Part II A supra (providing an analysis and review of empirical evidence of
agency costs in corporate social responsibility).
134. Shavell, supra note 36, at 233-34.
135. Id. at 234.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. See generally Enrique Dans, Volkswagen and the Failure of Corporate Social
Responsibility,
FORBES
(Sept.
27,
2015),
http://www.forbes.com/forbes/
welcome/?toURL=http://www.forbes.com/sites/enriquedans/2015/09/27/volkswagen-andthe-failure-of-corporate-social-responsibility/&refURL=https://www.google.com/
&referrer=https://www.google.com/ [https://perma.cc/SM5G-QTZW] (discussing the
Volkswagen emission regulation scandal).
139. MARK TWAIN, THE ADVENTURES OF HUCKLEBERRY FINN 161-162, 175 (Dover
Publications, Inc. 1994) (stating that Huck’s conscience tells him that “the right thing and
the clean thing”‘ is to return his friend Jim to his legal owner, Miss Watson, and that
otherwise he will be doomed to hell. His inner voice, on the other hand, reminds him that
Jim is his best friend, and it is better to be in hell with friends than to be saved from it with
Miss Watson. Huck decides to be true to himself, and follow his inner self- voice. “All
right,
then, I’ll go to hell,” he states: “I would take up wickedness again.”).
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140. See generally Shavell, supra note 36; Solomon, supra note 35 (both discussing law
and morality).
141. Pistor, supra note 37.
142. Bénabou & Tirole, supra note 28, at 15 (discussing socially responsible behavior as
a means to further societal goals); id. at 19.
143. See,
e.g.,
CSR
Report
2016,
122-135
(2016),
SONY
http://www.sony.net/SonyInfo/csr_report/
[https://perma.cc/2REP-3G4Z]
(describing
Sony’s recruiting and training of employees as corporate social responsibility).
144. See generally Social Saints, Fiscal Fiends, THE ECONOMIST: SCHUMPETER BLOG
(Jan. 2, 2016), http://www.economist.com/news/business-and-finance/21684770-socialsaints-fiscal-fiends-opinions-vary-whether-firms-can-be-socially-responsible
[https://perma.cc/9HXN-Q5BQ] (commenting on the tension between a corporation’s goal
to
 seek lower taxes and be socially responsible).
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having realized that human conscience can sometimes justify the cruelty
and injustice of slavery. Virtuous corporations require delegation of
authority to determine the normative contents of compliance and such
delegation can be misinterpreted and misused.140
Indeed, the nature and content of corporate social identities is decided
and framed by the corporation for itself. When corporations pursue values,
an immediate and pertinent concern is whose values are pursued and in
service of what interests. Katharina Pistor warns of “corporate legal
particularism,” referring to a self-contained legal order that serves special
interests.141 Like beauty, normative agendas are ultimately in the eye of the
beholder.
Attitudes on what is socially responsible are “rather
unscientific . . . and based on little information . . . framing is bound to
distort assessments: the choice of presenting a firm’s rationale for locating
a plant in a low-labour-cost country as ‘helping a poor country to develop’
or ‘minimizing labour cost’ is obviously not neutral.”142 Thus, reports of
corporate social responsibility vary in content, and they frequently refer to
the corporation’s core business.
For example, the training and
development of employees is often considered a manifestation of corporate
social responsibility and included in social responsibility reports, despite its
obvious contribution to the core business mission of the corporation.143
Corporate social identities may differ from each other quite extensively,
and there may be fundamental disagreements within a corporation about
what is the morally right way to behave.
Corporate social identities create a distributional tension, because the
social priorities of the corporation may differ from those of the public. As
the CSR tax straddle demonstrates, corporations may choose to engage in
voluntary corporate social conduct while making strenuous efforts to
minimize and even avoid paying tax.144 Consider for example Pfizer,
“embracing . . . responsibility to society . . . helping the world’s poor gain
access to its products,” and “strengthen[ing] and improv[ing] health-care


39057-ple_19-2 reissue Sheet No. 67 Side A

04/17/2017 09:23:23

3_AZGAD-TROMER_TO PRINTER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

THE VIRTUOUS CORPORATION

3/13/17 1:43 PM

367

systems,”145 while planning to shift its tax domicile from America to
Ireland, where corporate income taxes are considerably lower.146 Another
example is Etsy, a handmade good marketplace that went public in the U.S.
in 2015 as a certified B Corporation and simultaneously reorganized its
Irish subsidiary in a way that conceals its tax-cutting arrangements from
public view.147 Recent empirical research finds evidence that corporate
social responsibility is negatively related to five-year cash-effective tax
rates and positively related to tax lobbying expenditures, suggesting that,
on average, corporate social responsibility and tax payments act as
normative substitutes.148 Companies pursue their own values in their selfdetermined normative social identities where the corporation has a selfdetermined authority to specify the beneficiaries, the methods of
engagement, and the amount of resources devoted to its self-determined
social causes. Corporate social identities may thus pose a normative
substitute for the tax system for social redistribution, and may challenge the
democratic ideal.
CONCLUSION
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145. Id.; see also Corporate Responsibility: Bridging the Gap to Access for Patients in
Need, PFIZER, http://www.pfizer.com/responsibility [https://perma.cc/DJW3-979R] (last
visited Jan. 30, 2017) (discussing Pfizer’s corporate social responsibility).
146. See generally Liz Hoffman, Richard Rubin & Jonathan D. Rockoff, Taxes Drive
Potential Merger of Pfizer, Allergan, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 29, 2015),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/allergan-confirms-pfizer-talks-1446126062?mg=id-wsj
[https://perma.cc/JT7M-WL3J] (discussing Pfizer’s potential merger for tax purposes).
147. Jesse Drucker & Alex Barinka, Etsy’s B Corp Status Challenged by Tax Group
Over Irish Haven, BLOOMBERG TECH. (Sept. 1, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2015-09-01/etsy-s-b-corp-status-challenged-by-tax-group-over-irish-haven
[https://perma.cc/2X9H-UKS7].
148. Angela K. Davis et al., Do Socially Responsible Firms Pay More Taxes?, 91
A
CCOUNTING
REV. 47 (2016).
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With the popularity of Benefit Corporations and the rising trend of
corporate social initiatives by traditional C Corporations, the vision of
corporations actively generating their own norms of social conduct in
pursuit of their self-determined set of values is emerging as a prominent
model of corporate social conduct. This article analyzed the emerging
trend of “Corporate Social Identities,” arguing that incentives for corporate
social motivation are often rooted in the business purpose itself.
Corporations are induced to normative social conduct by their stakeholder
constituencies:
investors follow their conscience in responsible
investments; employees are better engaged, more productive and are easier
to recruit by ethical corporate employers; and consumers attribute virtue to
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moral brands, and might sanction the transgression of social norms by
consumer boycotts. Management’s private values induce the corporation to
social engagement. In addition, corporate social activity may serve a
political strategy, manipulating desired regulation or lack thereof.
Understanding the strategic incentives for corporate social motivation may
serve to create a better architecture of corporate law. When the strategic
incentives for corporate social conduct are high, and the social value of
corporate social conduct significant, the corporation may fulfill the vision
for social leadership supplementing or substituting public governance.
Law is most needed when the incentives for corporate social conduct are
insufficient, but the social value significant.
In particular, the analysis of corporate social motivation may lead to
full modeling of corporate social engagement, subject to empirical
evaluation. Future attention should be paid to how global and domestic
mechanisms may play a role in creating incentives diverting corporate
social motivation towards fulfilling significant social value in alignment
with social interests.
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